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ABSTRACT
The success of machine learning algorithms often relies on a large
amount of high-quality data to train well-performed models. How-
ever, data is a valuable resource and are always held by different
parties in reality. An effective solution to such a “data isolation"
problem is to employ federated learning, which allows multiple
parties to collaboratively train a model. In this paper, we propose
a Secure version of the widely used Maximum Mean Discrepancy
(SMMD) based on homomorphic encryption to enable effective
knowledge transfer under the data federation setting without com-
promising the data privacy. The proposed SMMD is able to avoid
the potential information leakage in transfer learning when align-
ing the source and target data distribution. As a result, both the
source domain and target domain can fully utilize their data to build
more scalable models. Experimental results demonstrate that our
proposed SMMD is secure and effective.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Use https://dl.acm.org/ccs.cfm to gen-
erate actual concepts section for your paper;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Witness the rapid development and significant success in various
applications, machine learning is gradually becoming a powerful
production tool for many organizations in recent years thanks to the
availability of large scale datasets [1, 2]. Numerous deep learning
models [7] were born and achieved state-of-the-art performance
on those prevalent benchmarks. However, annotating high-quality
labeled data is a very time-consuming process, especially for those
dense prediction tasks such as semantic segmentation. Transfer
learning [15] is an effective way to solve the difficulty of data
annotation by transferring knowledge from a related source domain
to the target domain. Besides, data required for training the models
may not be owned by a single organization and is always stored
across different institutions. Due to business competition, data
privacy issues, and regulatory requirements, different companies
often cannot share their own user data. Therefore, how to jointly
train machine learning models without leaking individual data
privacy is of great significance for deploying machine learning
models to practical applications.
As companies paymore andmore attention to privacy protection,
data privacy has become a topic of common concern all over the
world. In recent years, there has been a lot of news about the abuse
of data by the government and various companies. For example,
Figure 1: Illustration of secure transfer learning
Facebook’s massive user data leakage event caused strong repercus-
sions. In order to overcome those challenges, Google made the first
attempt to introduce a federated learning framework [14], in which
several distributed parties train a machine learning model collab-
oratively without exposing their raw data. In federated learning,
encrypted gradients are transmitted between independent organi-
zations and thus data owners may not suffer from privacy leakage.
Federated learning can be divided into two categories, i.e., horizon-
tal federated learning and vertical federated learning. In horizontal
federated learning, data records share the same feature space but
differ in the sample space. For example, considering e-commerce
companies located in different countries, their users are from differ-
ent regions but their business is similar, thus their feature spaces
may be identical. Similarly, vertical federated learning refers to
the situation where sample space is the same but feature space is
different. In this paper, we focus on the more challenging federated
learning setting where datasets may differ in both the sample and
feature space. In such a setting, we need to deal with heterogeneous
data sources and transfer the knowledge safely without violating
the privacy protection protocol.
To address the aforementioned challenges, inspired by the suc-
cess of transfer learning on effectively leveraging multiple data
sources, we propose a novel technique called Secure Maximum
Mean Discrepancy (SMMD) to prevent the potential privacy leak-
age when adopting the widely used maximum mean discrepancy
(MMD) alignment loss for knowledge transfer [6]. We incorporate
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [16] into existing maximum mean
discrepancy loss computation and thus help transfer information
from the source domain to the target domain safely. We conduct
extensive experiments on various datasets and the results demon-
strate that our proposed SMMD is secure and efficient. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce a privacy protection
mechanism to standard MMD and our SMMD can be adapted to
many transfer learning settings.
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2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Federated Learning
Federated learning [21] is a machine learning framework that can
effectively help multiple institutions to perform data usage and
machine learning modeling under the requirements of user pri-
vacy protection, data security, and government regulations. As a
distributed machine learning paradigm, federated learning can ef-
fectively solve the problem of data islands, allowing participants to
jointly model on the basis of not sharing data, which can technically
break the data islands and achieve AI collaboration. In [4], they pro-
posed a technique that introduces differential privacy into federated
learning to protect the client data. Like machine learning, federated
learning also requires that the training data is independently and
identically distributed, and the performance of federated learning
will be greatly reduced when faced with non-independently and
identically distributed data. In [22] they introduced an effective
mechanism to deal with the Non-IID data. Under normal circum-
stances, the number of devices in federated learning is often large,
and different devicesmay differ in the data size, data feature distribu-
tion, and available resources. In order to solve the above problems,
[10] proposed an optimization algorithm to ensure that the perfor-
mance of the federated learning model is fairly distributed among
various devices.
2.2 Transfer Learning
Transfer learning provides an effective approach to solving the
domain shift [19] problem between different datasets and enables
knowledge to transfer across domains. One of the most critical is-
sues in transfer learning is how tomeasure the distance between the
data distribution of the source and target domains and numerous ap-
proaches have been proposed [6, 8, 9, 13]. By adding an adaptation
layer between the source domain and the target domain and adding
a domain confusion loss function to allow the network to learn how
to classify, DDC [20] reduced the distribution difference between
the source domain and the target domain and thus achieved knowl-
edge transfer. However, DDC only fits one layer of the network
and uses only a single kernel MMD loss function, which might
not be optimal. To overcome these issues, DAN [12] proposes a
new deep adaptive network structure, which uses the multi-kernel
optimization selection method of mean embedded matching to fur-
ther reduce the domain gap. Inspired by the generative adversarial
network (GAN) [5], [17] incorporated adversarial training into the
domain adaptation process where a domain classifier was applied to
achieve domain-invariant feature extraction. In [11], they provided
a novel secure federated transfer learning framework that equips
conventional neural networks with additively homomorphic en-
cryption (HE) and multi-party computation (MPC). Unlike existing
transfer learning methods that deal with the homogeneous feature
space, [3] introduced a secure multi-party computation protocol to
mitigate the domain shift in heterogeneous feature space.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider a labeled source domain dataset 𝑋𝑠 =
{(
x𝑠𝑖 , 𝑦
𝑠
𝑖
)}𝑁𝑠
𝑖=1
with
𝑁𝑠 annotated samples, where x𝑠𝑖 is the i-th sample drawn from a
Figure 2: Overall framework of our proposed SMMD
source distribution 𝑃𝑆 (x, 𝑦). 𝑦𝑠𝑖 is the corresponding label. Anal-
ogously, we represent the unannotated target domain as 𝑋 𝑡 ={
x𝑡𝑖
}𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1, where x
𝑡
𝑖 is the i-th sample drawn from a target distribu-
tion 𝑃𝑇 (x, 𝑦), and 𝑁𝑡 is the total sample number in target domain.
We also consider the existence of a set of co-occurrence data sam-
ples 𝑋𝑠𝑡 =
{(
x𝑠𝑖 , 𝑥
𝑡
𝑖
)}𝑁𝑠𝑡
𝑖=1
.We focus on the transfer learning setting
so we assume that the source and target domain have different
data distribution, i.e., 𝑃𝑆 (x, 𝑦) ≠ 𝑃𝑇 (x, 𝑦). As illustrated in Figure.1,
we aim to design a classifier 𝑦 = 𝑓𝑠 (x) and transfer it to the tar-
get domain without information leakage, such that the expected
target risk 𝑅𝑡 = E(x,𝑦)∼𝑃𝑇 [𝑓𝑠 (x) ≠ 𝑦] is bounded by utilizing the
well-annotated source domain data.
4 PROPOSED METHOD
4.1 Introduction to MMD
Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) is a widely used method
to measure the distance between the data distribution of source
domain and target domain. Given the above source domain dataset
𝑋𝑠 and target domain dataset 𝑋 𝑡 , MMD is defined as the mean
embedding difference between the two sets of samples:
MMD2 [𝑋𝑠 , 𝑋 𝑡 ]
=
E𝑥𝑠∼PS (x,y) [𝜙 (xs) ] − E𝑥𝑡∼PT (x,y) [𝜙 (xt) ]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(1)
where 𝜙 (·) is the feature mapping function.
4.2 Secure MMD
Formally, consider a source domain network𝐶𝑠 and a target domain
network 𝐶𝑡 , which take the source domain data 𝑥𝑠𝑖 and target do-
main data 𝑥𝑡𝑖 as input, respectively. Suppose there are total 𝐿 layers
in each network, where 𝐿 = 𝐿1 + 𝐿2. We adopt a weakly-shared
2
transfer learning manner and align the later 𝐿2 layers of source
and target network, as shown in Figure.2. Let ℎ𝑙 (𝑥𝑠 ) and ℎ𝑙 (𝑥𝑡 )
denote the hidden representation of layer 𝑙 extracted by the source
domain and target domain network, respectively. Following [18],
we also use a translator function to provide pseudo label for the
co-occurrence unlabeled target data. The classification objective
using the co-occurrence set can be summarized as:
argmin
Θ𝑠 ,Θ𝑡
L𝑐𝑙𝑠 =
𝑁𝑠𝑡∑︁
𝑖
ℓ1
(
𝑦𝑠𝑖 , 𝑦
𝑡
𝑖
)
, (2)
where Θ𝑠 and Θ𝑡 are the network parameter of source and target
domain network, 𝑦𝑡𝑖 is the pseudo label of target data provided by
the available source data. We adopt the conventional logistic loss
for the classification task.
In addition to the logistic loss ℓ1 for classification, we also need
to align the intermediate hidden representation of source and target
domain data. The first 𝐿1 layers of source and target network are
expected to learn domain-specific feature while the latter 𝐿2 layers
are supposed to learn domain-invariant feature. We minimize the
following loss function to achieve this goal:
argmin
Θ𝑠 ,Θ𝑡
L𝑚𝑚𝑑 =
𝐿2∑︁
𝑖=𝐿1+1
ℓ2 (ℎ𝑖 (𝑥𝑠 ) , ℎ𝑖 (𝑥𝑡 )) , (3)
where 𝐿2 is the alignment loss, we choose the widely used MMD
as our alignment function. In order to ensure there is no informa-
tion leakage in the feature alignment process, we add additively
homomorphic encryption to the original MMD loss.
4.3 Training Objective and Optimization
By combining the aforementioned loss functions, we can summarize
the overall optimization objective as:
argmin
𝜃𝑠 ,𝜃𝑡
L = L𝑐𝑙𝑠 + 𝛼L𝑚𝑚𝑑 + 𝛽2
(
L𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑔 + L𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑔
)
(4)
where L𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑔 and L𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑔 are the regularization term for source and
target network. For the classification loss, we use the second order
Taylor expansion to calculate the gradient during the backpropaga-
tion process. Applying equation (4) with additively homomorphic
encryption [[·]]:
L =
𝑁𝑠𝑡∑︁
𝑖
( [ [
ℓ1
(
𝑦𝑠𝑖 , 𝑦
𝑡
𝑖
) ] ] )
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,
(5)
where k() denotes the kernel function. By evaluating the derivative
of 𝜃𝑠 we obtain:[ [
𝜕L
𝜕𝜃𝑠
] ]
=
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similarly for 𝜃𝑡 we have:[ [
𝜕L
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(7)
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Datasets
We conduct extensive experiments onmultiple mainstream datasets:
(1) UCI-Credit-Card dataset: This dataset contains information
about default payments, demographic factors, credit data, payment
history, and billing for credit card customers in Taiwan from April
2005 to September 2005. The overall dataset contains 30,000 records
and 23 features. (2) UCI-Census-Income dataset: this dataset was
collected from the 1994 Census bureau database. A set of records
was obtained by using some filter conditions. We divide the fea-
ture space into two disjoint spaces, i.e., one for source domain and
another for target domain to achieve transfer learning. Our model
consists of several convolutional layers to extract features followed
by a sigmoid layer for classification and we set 𝐿1 = 1 and 𝐿2 = 1
in our experiment. The neuron numbers of the first 𝐿1 and latter
𝐿2 are set to 128 and 64, respectively.
5.2 Impact of different kernel function
We choose various kernel functions to analyze their impact on the
network transferability. Three popular kernel functions are tested
in our experiments. Specifically, we have:
• Linear kernel: 𝑘 (x, y) = x𝑇 y
• Polynomial kernel: 𝑘 (x, y) =
(
x𝑇 y + 𝑐
)𝑑
• Gaussian kernel: 𝑘 (x, y) = exp
(
− ∥x−y∥
2
2
2𝜎2
)
We compare the model performance under different kernel func-
tion setting and present the result in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3.
As shown in Table 1, the encrypted linear kernel version achieves
almost the same accuracy as the non-encrypted version. Compared
with the safety of the calculation process, the loss of accuracy
is almost negligible. For polynomial kernel we use the version of
𝑐 = 0, 𝑑 = 2 and 𝑐 = 0, 𝑑 = 3. By increasing d we observe a slight per-
formance loss, because higher degree of the polynomial makes the
calculation process more complicated. For the Gaussian kernel, we
3
Table 1: Experimental results on the UCI-Credit-Card/UCI-
Census-Income dataset using linear kernel
UCI-Credit-Card UCI-Census-Income
fscore auc precision fscore auc precision
encrypted 0.684 0.722 0.695 0.781 0.845 0.791
w/o encryption 0.693 0.730 0.698 0.790 0.853 0.799
source only 0.665 0.701 0.662 0.754 0.817 0.763
Table 2: Experimental results on the UCI-Credit-Card/UCI-
Census-Income dataset using polynomial kernel
UCI-Credit-Card UCI-Census-Income
fscore auc precision fscore auc precision
encrypted(c=0,d=2) 0.678 0.721 0.687 0.782 0.846 0.790
encrypted(c=0,d=3) 0.671 0.723 0.678 0.783 0.845 0.791
w/o encrption
(c=0,d=2)
0.685 0.729 0.688 0.790 0.854 0.798
w/o encrption
(c=0,d=3)
0.674 0.728 0.679 0.789 0.855 0.797
source only 0.665 0.701 0.662 0.754 0.817 0.763
Table 3: Experimental results on the UCI-Credit-Card/UCI-
Census-Income dataset using Gaussian kernel
UCI-Credit-Card UCI-Census-Income
fscore auc precision fscore auc precision
encrypted(𝜎 = 1) 0.688 0.724 0.696 0.787 0.851 0.793
encrypted(𝜎 = 2) 0.686 0.725 0.697 0.786 0.859 0.796
w/o encrption
(𝜎 = 1)
0.702 0.739 0.703 0.795 0.868 0.799
w/o encrption
(𝜎 = 2)
0.711 0.743 0.709 0.801 0.867 0.808
source only 0.665 0.701 0.662 0.754 0.817 0.763
use its second-order Taylor expansion. Among the aforementioned
kernel functions, Gaussian kernel obtains the best performance due
to its excellent ability to measure the distance. We also run FTL[11]
on those two datasets and obtain the auc of 0.712 and 0.837, which
proves the superiority of our method.
5.3 Transfer learning vs source-only
To verify the effectiveness of transfer learning, we also compare the
performance of transfer learning method and source only method.
In the source-only version, we only use the source domain data with-
out accessing the target domain data. Compared with the transfer
learning method, the performance of the source-only method will
be greatly reduced, which also proves the effectiveness of transfer
learning.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a secure distance measurement metric,
named secure maximum mean discrepancy (SMMD), to avoid the
potential information leakage in transfer learning. Compared with
existing secure transfer learning methods that always suffer from
significant performance drop, our proposed MMD is almost as
precise as the non-secure version. Our future work includes a more
comprehensive analysis of the impact of kernel functions on the
transfer performance.
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